State Immunity and Certain Unresolved Problems

In the logical and objective Freudian psychoanalytic realms of the subconscious and unconscious mind, no one worries or resigns himself to death for an already dying concern, and faith is more powerful than doubt and despair. But over the years the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been attacked by leading scholars and it would appear that all leading text writers who have specifically studied the subject, although did not speak with one voice, are agreed that immunity be restricted. And interestingly enough, one leading scholar, on record even went as far as to proclaim “from the mountaintop” that sovereign immunity be abandoned for the sake of justice. His persuasive thesis seemed to have perhaps influenced the learned Thai jurist, Dr. Sucharitkul to also call for a complete abandonment of absolute immunity of states in his well-cited 1959 work. So far, however, it would appear sovereign immunity is holding steady and therefore arguably here to stay, for it would take more than juristic writings to destroy the corpus and animus of sovereign immunity. Hence it would be expedient to put on a lantern for this uncharted journey rather than curse the darkness. and it will certainly be defeatist to pray in our pleading for deus ex machina, in view of the fact that in these modern times, such unexpected hidden or spiritual powers have in reality ceased to be forthcoming when called to save a difficult situation.

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Notes

Lauterpacht (1951), pp. 220–272; Weiss (1922a), p. 94; Allen (1933); Watkins (1927); Hyde (1945); Friedman (1938), The Growth of State Control BYIL XIX; Mann (1979); 1978 BYIL 50, p. 43; Lowenfeld (1950), pp. 204–217; Lowenfeld (1952), p. 215: see also Lord Denning’s Position on the Subject in Rahimtoula V. Nizam of Hyderabad (1957), 3 WLR 884; and Trendtex and I Congreso del Partido; Carter (1955), p. 469; Sucharitkul (1959), pp. 1–240.

Lauterpacht (1951), pp. 220–224. Sucharitkul (1959), pp. 355–359.

Littrel v. United States of America (No 2) (1994), 2 All ER 203 Court of Appeal; Van Der Hurst v. United States 94 ILR 374, The Netherlands Supreme Court; John McElhinney v. Anthony Ivor John Williams and Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Supreme Court decision 15th Dec 1995, per Hamilton CJ.

Higgins (1982), pp. 265–276; Sucharitkul (1976), pp. 87–216; Schreuer (1988).

See generally The International Law Commission’s Report, (1981–1988), for detailed analysis of the position of the Third World and Russia (formerly USSR), Part V: Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Sovereign States, pp. 557–645 Togo at p. 607; Venezuela at p. 638; Syria at p. 605; Sudan at p. 605; and USSR at p. 617.

(1950), The Asylum Case ICJ Reports p. 266; (1969), North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports p. 3; Villiger (1985), pp. 3–40; Wolfke (1993); Kunz (1953), p. 662; Thirlway (1972); Akehurst (1974–1975), p. 1; D’Amato (1971), pp. 1–38.

Cheshire and North (1992), pp. 179–219, 223.

Juan Ysmach Co. Inc. v. Indonesian Government (1954), 3 WLR 351; Trendtex Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), IQB 529; Claims against the Empire of Iran (1963), BVerfGE 16: 45 ILR 57; Lord Wilberforce (1981), I Congreso del Partido 3 WLR 328 per; The Pesaro (1926) 271 US 30; Republic of Mexico v. Huffman (1945), 324 US 30; State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank (1953), 99 Fed Supp 655; National American Corporation v. Federal Rep of Nigeria (1978), 448 S.Supp 622; Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba (1976), 125 US 682.

(1880), 5 PD 197.

Trendtex Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), IQB 529; Claims against the Empire of Iran (1963), BVerfGE 16; National American Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1978), 448 F.Supp 622; The Philippine Admiral (1977), AC 373.

Cheshire and North (1992), pp. 183–184; McDonald v. Mabee (1917), 243 US 90, at 91. Cheshire and North (1992), pp. 214–215. Higgins (1977), 71 AJIL. Tani v. Russian Trade Delegations in Italy (1948), Annual Digest 15 pp. 141–144. Jennings (1962), p. 32, Mordisil Tidscrift For Int., Reg. (1962); Mann (1973), pp. 1–140. Lowenfeld (1979), pp. 321–330.

Akehurst (1972–1973), pp. 145–259; Mann (1964); Ehrenzweig (1956), p. 65, YLJ 289; Dicey and Morris (1992); Cheshire and North (1992).

(1938), AC 485 House of Lords. Morris (1993), pp. 7–11. Morris (1993), p. 7 (footnote note 32). Ehrenzweig (1956), p. 637; Ehrenzweig (1965), p. 340; Currie (1963), pp. 1–160. Claims against the Empire of Iran (1963), BVerfGe 16, 45 ILR p. 59. (1958), AC 379 p. 422. (1975), IWLR p. 1492.

Zernice K. v. Brown and Root Inc. and others (1993), 92 IL Reports p. 442; Nelson v. Saudi Arabia (1992), 88 IL Reports p. 189.

(1995), 1 WLR 1147 House of Lords.

Morellet v. Governo Danese (Giu. It. 1883-1-125); Guttieres v. Elmilik, (F. It. 1886-1-913, 920, 922); Sucharitkul (1959), pp. 233–242.

See Bhattacharyya (1949), p. 10, but see also, Sabine and Thorson (1973); Appadorai (1968); Laski (1967); Dunning (1902); Holland (1916).

Fitzmaurice (1933), p. 121; Lauterpacht (1951), p. 220.

Bhattacharyya (1949); Dunning (1905); Bryce (1901); Lauterpacht (1951), pp. 28–200; Fitzmaurice (1933), 14 BYIL.

(1926), 27 U.S. 562. Brownlie (1990), p. 331. (1981), 1 All ER p. 1102. Weiss (1922b), pp. 545–546. Higgins (1982), p. 265.

Trendtex Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), 2 WLR; I Congreso des Partido (1981), 3 WLR 328.

Higgins (1994), p. 85.

The State of Romania v. Pascalet, AD, 2 (1923–24), No. 68 must be carefully contrasted with Lakhowsky v. Swiss Federal Government, AD, 1 (1919–1922) No. 85.

Kingdom of Romania v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (1918), 2nd 250 Fed 341, 343. Governor Rumeno v. Trutta, Giurisprudenza Italiana (1926), (1) p. 774. Planmount Ltd. v. Republic of Zaire (1981), 1. All ER 1110. Govt. of the Democratic Rep of the Congo v. Venne (1983), ILR 64 24–46. See FISA (1976), generally. Higgins (1982), p. 268.

Yousef Nada v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Dec. 2, 1975, Provincial Court of Frankfurt; National American Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria (1978), p. 448 F.Supp 622; I Congreso del Partido (1981), 3 WLR 328. All the national legislation currently in place also rejected the purpose test.

I Congreso del Partido (per Lord Wilberforce) House of Lords (1983), AC 244, p. 268. Here it would appear the learned judge was trying to argue the private/public law distinction.

(1961), 44 ILR 74. (1973), 45 ILR 82.

(1973), 65 ILR 61. In 1991 French courts reiterated their position in Société Euroéquipement v. Centre European de la Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Productions Agricoles de la Côte d’Ivoire, Tribunal of Instance, Paris France: Feb. 1991, by Mahiou (1991), in 118 JD1 408; Sieur Mouracade v. Yamen (1992), in 119 JD1 398.

Association of Italian Knights of the Order of Malta v. Piccoli (1974), 65 ILR 308.

Empire of Iran Case (1963), 45 ILR 57, 80; Arab Republic of Egypt v. Cinetelevision International Registered Trust (1979), 65 ILR 425 431; A Limited v. B Bank and Bank of X, 31 July 1996, Court of Appeal U.K. (1992) Constitutional F. Court, Candor v. Filvern v. Minister of Justice, ILR 101 p. 394.

53 Dec. 2 (1975), Provincial Court of Frankfurt. I Congrego del Partido (1983), AC per Lord Wilberforce, pp. 271–72. (1963) VerfGE16, 45 ILR 57.

Trendtex Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), IQB 529; Hispanio America Mercantil SA v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1979), 2 LLR 277; Consorzio Agrario di Tripolitania v. Federazione Italiana Consorzi Agrari Guistizia Civile (1985), 65 ILR 265; Ditta Companione v. Ditta Peti Nitrogenmuvek (1972), n. 3368 1st Sess.

(1979), 1 Lloyd’s Rep. p. 481. (1979), 1 Lloyd’s Rep. pp. 487–488. (1979), AC 351 House of Lords per Lord Wilberforce. Lauterpacht (1951), p. 137. Fitzmaurice (1933), p. 121.

See O’Conell (1970), p. 846: Even today, one would be hard put to take issue with Professor O’Connell’s argument.

See Fawcett (1963), p. 35. Professor Fawcett’s arguments are weighty and very convincing. Fairman (1928), pp. 569–574. Hyde (1945), Vol. II. (1980), 1 LLR 39. See Doc No. AALCC 1M/87/1 Nov. 1987, for details respecting the protest. I Congreso (1978), per Goff 1 All ER p. 1192. I Congreso (1978), per Goff 1 All ER p. 1192. (1985), 770 F.2d 1385. (1978), BGE1104 1a; (1984), 65 ILR 417. (1978), 1 All ER, p. 1192.

The U.S. during the cold war period put in place an embargo against Cuba in order to bring down the socialist government of Fidel Castro. It must be also stated that Cuba is a civil law country but refuses to have anything to do with Capitalism since 1958. Its position respecting the events which occurred in Chile is understandable given its Socialist policies.

(1981), 3 WLR 328, 334. (1977), 2 WLR 356; Court of Appeal per Stephenson. I Congreso per Lord Wilberforce and Edmund-Davies (1983), International Legal Rep. p. 308. Lauterpacht (1951); Sinclair (1980), p. 113. (1985), 770 F.2d 1385. Akehurst (1972–1973); Mann (1964) (on the question of jurisdiction), pp. 9–162.

Association de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States (1983), DDC 561, F.Supp. 1190, 1198; Frolova v. USSR (1983), 559 F.Supp. 358, 363.

See for example the U.S. Act 1976, the U.K. Act 1978, and the Canadian Act 1982. Schreuer (1988), pp. 63–91. Morris (1984), p. 132; International Law in a Changing World (UN Pub 1963) p. 83. Schreuer (1988), p. 19.

Morris (1984), pp. 131–143; Lillich and Brower (1994); Mann (1967); Carlston (1946); Steyn (1991); Lalive (1980).

Morris(1984); Lillich and Brower (1994), pp. 3–49. Morris (1984), pp. 131–139. Schreuer (1988), pp. 70–71; Sullivan (1983), p. 329; Simpson and Fox (1959), pp. 40–55. Schreuer (1988), p. 70. Morris (1984), pp. 131–139. Morris (1984), pp. 131–139. See The 1978 UK Act § (9).

A careful review of all these national legislation shows that they do not differ at all on this very issue. A good comparison would be helpful (e.g., the U.K. Act 1978 and that of Section 10 of the South African Act).

See generally the Canadian Act 1982. See Lillich and Brower (1994), pp. 61–115; 223–275. (1980), SDNY 488 F.Supp. 1284.

Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria (1981), 2d Cir 647 F.2d. 300; Chicago Bridge and Iron Company v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1982), 62 ILR 511.

(1985), DDC F. Supp. 613, 863. Morris (1984), p. 137.

Schreuer (1988), pp. 137–167; Brownlie (1990), pp. 341–342; Sucharitkul (1976) Second Report, Yrbk ILC; O’Conell (1970), pp. 877–878; and case law respecting this subject is fraught with uncertainties; Montefiore v. Belgian Congo, ILR 44, 72; Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corporation (1971), 1 WLR 603 CA.

Blair (1998), pp. 374, 375.

Schreuer (1988), pp. 121–124; Blair (1998), pp. 385–386; Baccus SRL v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo (1957), 1 Q 438; Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), QB 529, ILR 64 1983 p. 111.

(1954), 1 QB 438.

Sinclair (1980), p. 119; Sucharitkul (1959), pp. 162–182; Annuaire Year Book (Institute de Droit Int.) Cairo (1987); Basle (1991), Annuaire Yearbook.

Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), Q.B. 560. (1971), IWLR 604 CA. Per Lord Denning (1977), QB 560. Sinclair (1980); Sucharitkul (1959), pp. 113–120.

See ILC Draft Articles 3(a) I, II, III, IV and Article 7. See also recent cases on this matter: Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines (1992), 103 ILR p. 503; Arriba Limited v. Petroleous Mexicanos (1992), ILR p. 490.

(1996), 3 WLR 759. (1966), 3 WLR p. 760. Camdex International v. Bank of Zambia (No. 2) 1 All ER 728, 722 per Sir Bingham M.R. Camdex International v. Bank of Zambia (No. 2) 1 All ER 728. Blair (1998), p. 389.

Blair (1998), p. 389. This must be compared to the decision in Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales Inc. (1992), ILR 103 p. 503.

ILR 45, p. 57.

For a clear exposition of the subject see Singer (1981), The Act of State Doctrine of the United Kingdom: An Analysis with Comparison to the United States Practice 75 AJIL, 283. Wade (1934), pp. 98, 104.

Buergenthan and Maier (1989), p. 233. Johnson v. Peddlar (1921), 2 AC 262 [House of Lords]/Luther v. Sagor 3 K.B. 532 CA. (1921), 3 KB 532 CA. (1921), 3 KB 532 CA. Wallace (1986), pp. 48–50. (1897), 168 US 250. (1897), 168 US 250. (1964), 376 U.S. 398, 428. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank (1967), 270 F Supp. 1004 (1984) SDNY, 1465, 1470, 589 F.Supp. SA. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964), 376 US 398, 84, S Ct 923, II L Ed 2d 804. See Akehurst (1991), p. 47.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964), Supreme Court of the U.S. 376 US 398, 84 S Ct 923 II L Ed 2 804.

Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA (1984), U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit 735 F.2d 645; Allied Bank Int. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (1985), U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit, 757 F.2d 516.

Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba (1976), 125 US 682; Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex (1979), AC 351, ILR 64 (1983).

Kirkpatrick & Co. Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. (1990), International Supreme Court of the United States. 493 US 400, 110 S Ct, 701 L Ed 2s 816.

Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), QB 529; Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex (1979), AC 351; I Congreso del Partido (1983), 1 AC 244; De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua (1985), 5th Circuit 770 F.2d 1385; The Uganda Co. v. The Government of Uganda (1979), 1 Lloyds Rep 481.

(1979), AC 351. (1979), AC 351. (1978), 1 QB 194. (1979), AC 364. (1983), ILR 64.

Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. The Government of Uganda (1979), 1 Lloyds Law Reports 481 at 488; IAM v. OPEC (1981), 649 F.2d at 1359; Spocil v. Crowe (1974), 480 F.2d 614; I Congreso (1983), 1 AC 244; De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua (1985), 5th Circuit 770 F.2d 1384.

(1960), 7 Netherlands Int. Law Reports 399. However, on appeal a different decision was handed down. Med. Jurisprudence (1959), p. 164.

Recent decisions seemed to be gravitating in according complete immunity. Rolimpex, Uganda Holding and De Sanchez cases are good examples.

Association de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States (1983), DDC 561 F.Supp. 1190, 1198; Dalehite v. United States (1953), 97 LED 1427; De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua (1985), 5th Cir. 770 F.2d 1385.

DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua (1985), 770 F.2d 1385. (1978), QB 197. (1979), AC 364. (1978), 448 F.Supp. 622. (1976), 125 U 682. In this case Cuba specifically offered in her defence the act of state doctrine.

(2014), EWCA Civ. 1394 (30 October 2014): cited as [2015] 2WLR1105: In the Arrest Warrant Case (11 April 2000) [2002]: “The court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they have committed irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.” In Jones v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Lord Hoffmann relied on the judgment of the ICJ in DRC v Belgium in making the following trenchant observation… “The International Court of Justice accepted that the law prohibiting the commission of such crimes was jus cogens but held that this did not entail an exception to the rule of state immunity for a head of state and certain other high state officials including a foreign minister.” [2006] UKHL 26, para 48. Although the judgment by the Supreme Court of the United States in Samantar lacked usus it is important to consider the judgment of Professor Cassese in Prosecutor v Blaskin (1997) 110 ILR 607, 707 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: see also Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran ILR 427.

Underhill v Hernandez (1897), 168 US 250, 252: The Act of State Doctrine can also be found in Chief Justice John Marshall’s judgment in the Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812), 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, although it was not specifically mentioned or plainly stated, its soul and spirit can be found in the said judgment; see generally Mok (1996), p. 199.

Underhill v Hernandez (1897), 168 US 250, 252. This judgment granted immunity from an inquiry into an act of state.

Underhill v Hernandez (1897), 168 US 250, 252.

Oetjen v Central Leather Co (1918), 246 US 297; Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino (1964), 376 US 398; Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812), 11 US 116.

Tunkin (1976), pp. 48–52. Classic international law, according to Professor Tunkin, did not prohibit the use of force, for it encouraged colonialism and the search for spheres of influence by European powers. Classic international law was abolished after the Second World War.

Kirkpatrick & Co v Environmental Tectonics Corp (1990), 493 US 400; Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, (DCC 2012), 672 F3d 1066.

Oppenheimer v Cattermole (1967), AC 249; Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002], 2 AC 833.

Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co No 2, (30 October 2014) QB 485, para [66]: can also be found in Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors EWCA [2014] civ 1394.

Morris (1984), p. 41; Guaranty Trust Corporation of New York v Hannay (1918), 2 KB 623, 655; Dynamit AG v Rio Tinto Co (1918), AC 260, 295. Thus if the plaintiff cannot offer a credible evidence of the law, i.e., foreign law, the judge must apply the law of the forum.

Mann (1990), pp. 177–183, 202. Morris (1984), pp. 302–303.

Oetjen v Central Leather Co. (1918), 246 US 297; Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino (1964), 376 US 398, 46, Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812), 11 US 116.

Ehrenzweig (1965), pp. 107–110, the argument that the lex fori is the basic law of private international law cannot be disputed. See also Morris (1984), pp. 9–11.

Jones v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006], UKHL 26; Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait (No 2) (1996), 107 ILR 536 549; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001), 34 EHRR 273.

Arrest Warrant Case (2002), ICJ Rep 3, para 54.

See Prosecutor v Blaskic (1997), 110 ILR 607, 707, the Appeals Chamber of International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; Twycross v Dreyfus (1877), LR 5 CHD 605, 618–619; Jaffe v Miller (1993), 113 OR 745, 758–759.

Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, EHRR, 273 para 61. [2006], UK HL 26 para 12. (2006), UK HL 26 para 31. (1976), AC 249. (2002), 2 AC 833.

Belhaj & Anor v Straw & others (30 October 2014), EWCA CIV 1394 para 115, p. 43: See Kelsen (1952), for further explanation on acts committed by organs of state.

Cheng (1966), Yearbook of World Affairs pp. 241, 255–256; Kelsen (1950), preface on interpretation, pp. xiii et seq.

Jones v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2006), UKHL 26, para 64. (This case was litigated before the House of Lords and before the European Court of Human Rights.)

See Article 14(1) of the Torture Convention which provides that a state must “ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.”

Jones v Saudi Arabia (2006), UKL 6 para 31.

Case concerning the Arrest Warrant Case of 11 April 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (2002), ICJ Rep 3, paras 51, 54, 58, 85; Watts (1994); Satow (1979); In this respect, customary law is being formed by the conduct of states (pars pro toto) as subjects of Public International Law.

See the 11th Amendment of the US Constitution: Reference must also be made to Executive and Parliamentary privileges.

Cassese (2003), pp. 267, 273–274: These domestic laws are enacted to promote the doctrine of separation of powers and to protect state organs of their independence.

Cassese (2003), p. 264.

(1981), 3 WLR 328, 334; This is because such national legislation or domestic laws fall outside the rules of general application duly recognised and legally binding on states.

Cassese (2003), pp. 273, 264–274. Cassese (2003), p. 264.

Jones v Saudi Arabia (2006), UKHL 26. The House of Lords ruled in favour of Saudi Arabia because the crime in issue was committed in Saudi Arabia, but not in the Forum. Thus, if the crimes of torture were committed in the Forum, the judgment would have been in favour of Jones.

Case No 05-5017 (2006). Case No 04-5199, US Court of Appeals. Para 31 (2017), UKSC 3. Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd. (1938), 1 Ch 545 No. 1; Ysmael (1955), AC 72.

Arab Republic of Egypt v. Cinetelevision Int. (1983), ILR 65 430; Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia (1984), AC 580; Hispano Americana Mercantil SA v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1979), 2 Lords Rep 277; Philippine Embassy Case (1977), BVerfGE 46, 342, 399.

See Higgins (1982), pp. 270–277.

References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dallas, TX, USA Ernest K. Bankas
  1. Ernest K. Bankas